Since the January 25 Palestinian elections won by Hamas there has developed a strong school of thought within the security community advocating a military move to inflict heavy damage on Hamas and persuade it to abandon politics. It argues that Israel cannot tolerate an Islamist political neighbor bent on its eventual destruction and allied with other Islamist radical movements throughout the region, and should preempt (or exploit an opportunity like the Shalit affair) before Hamas begins building up an army in Gaza.
But what would come after Hamas? It is extremely unlikely that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) would simply agree to appoint an alternative, non-Hamas government, or that the Hamas-majority Palestinian Legislative Council, with or without the Hamas MPs Israel has jailed, would approve a non-Hamas government. In such an event, Abu Mazen would be pilloried as a quisling. More likely he would resign, possibly seeking to dissolve the Palestinian Authority. The outcome would be anarchy, with Israel either obliged to complete its reoccupation and reestablish its rule over, and responsibility for, some 3.5 million Palestinians, or to beg the international community to step in. Neither of these contingencies offers Israel a potential Palestinian partner from whom a degree of responsibility can be demanded, and neither necessarily bespeaks an enhanced situation for Israel compared to the present situation, with Hamas broadly boycotted and failing to fulfill its basic obligations of governance. On the other hand, the moment Israel reaches a deal for the release of Shalit, this is liable to be interpreted in some circles as indirect recognition by Israel of the Hamas-led government, with all that this implies....
In order for this gradual approach to work, the Hamas-dominated Palestinian government presumably has to be sensitive to the suffering of its people and to be capable of exercising control over all armed factions. It has to feel threatened, but also to perceive some sort of political reward at the end of the process, such as greater international recognition or at least an enhanced capacity to govern.
If we want peace in the Middle East, engage Israel. Engage Hamas. Engage Iran. Otherwise, war will continue.
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